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GRAYNED V. CITY OF ROCKFORD-A LIMITATION
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE OVERBREADTH
DOCTRINE TO ANTIDISTURBANCE REGULATIONS
IN THE SCHOOLS
In the 1972 case Grayned v. City of Rockford,' the United States
Supreme Court refused to invoke the "overbreadth doctrine" under the
First Amendment to invalidate a statute prohibiting disturbances in
the city's schools. In so doing, the Court strengthened the authority of
school administrators and legislatures to maintain order on campuses
and in classrooms through the use of general antidisturbance regula-
tions which had often previously been held unconstitutional under a
"facial application!' of the overbreadth test.
2
The Grayned decision was basically a choice between two conflict-
ing First Amendment doctrines which had both been developed to
protect free expression against unconstitutional regulation. The facial
attack on overbroad laws was developed to combat laws hypothetically
capable of unconstitutional application. Under this test a regulation
might be held invalid even though the facts of the case before the
court would not qualify for constitutional protection, and the de-
fendant's acts could have been prohibited by a properly drawn statute.3
The alternative approach is best illustrated by the landmark case, Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.4 The Supreme
Court there held that students did not check their constitutional rights
"at the schoolhouse gate," and that the First Amendment protected
certain expression in the school classroom." The prohibited expression
in Tinker-the wearing of armbands protesting United States involve-
ment in Vietnam-was held to be protected because it did not disturb
any educational activities.6 The court in Tinker thus did not overrule
1. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
2. See text accompanying notes 55-64 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
4. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (district court's approval of student's suspension re-
versed). For landmark decisions in related areas such as due process for students and
equal protection in the schools see Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54
CALiF. L. REv. 1 (1966).
5. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
6. The Tinker reasoning has been similarly applied to a teacher who wore a
black armband. Central Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. James, 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3313 (1972).
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the school regulation on grounds of a hypothetical constitutional in-
firmity, but measured the specific facts of the Tinker case against a
"disturbance criteria." However, the Tinker decision did little to
clarify, define or narrow the meaning of "disturbance." As a result,
while some courts attempted to follow the Tinker approach on a
case-by-case basis, other courts utilized the overbreadth doctrine
sweepingly to invalidate school conduct regulations without regard to
the offending conduct actually at issue.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford the Supreme Court rejected the
facial approach and reaffirmed the Tinker holding that the validity of
a regulation of expression in the schools must depend upon whether
any disturbance of educational activities would result from the ex-
pression.' This note will examine the background of this controversy,
analyze the reasons for the Court's choice in Grayned, and explore the
implications of the decision.
The Regulation of Expression in the Schools
The Historical Perspective
The confrontations in the schools during the 1960s produced ma-
jor changes in traditional notions of school authority, discipline, and
student rights." The authoritarian relationship of schools to students
that had characterized education for generations came under attack as
the courts began increasingly to resolve disputes by making determina-
tions which had previously been left to educators. 9 Prior to this change,
school administrators had broad powers to act in loco parentis; they
controlled every aspect of student life, from educational to social, po-
litical, and moral, during school hours and even after school hours
and to a large extent off of school facilities. 10 The attitude of the
courts was that this was an area outside of their competence. The ed-
7. The activities common to demonstrations in the schools and elsewhere may
include "pure speech," expressive conduct, assembly, and petitioning for redress of
grievances through picketing or leafletting. For simplicity this note will refer to
any or all of these activities as expression. For discussions of the extent to which
conduct may be accorded the same protection as "pure speech" see T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Con-
duct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SUPREME Or. RaV. 1; Kaufman, The
Medium, the Message and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 761 (1970).
8. For reviews of some of the major confrontations of the decade and their
legal consequences see REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON CAMPUS DISTURBANCES, J.
OF THE (CALIF.) ASSEMBLY (Supp. App. 1969); Symposium: Student Rights and
Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1966).
9. See Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior and the Legal Authority of
Public School Officials, 19 J. PUB. L. 209 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ladd].
10. The decline of the in loco parentis role is examined in Beaney, Students,
Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 513-17 (1968).
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ucator, by virtue of his training and experience, was the one to decide
whether the needs of education justified an abridgment of student
rights. Any inquiry by the courts into a rule or regulation was con-
fined to whether any reasonable educational justification could be
asserted.11 The definition of educational purposes and objectives and
the means of their advancement were left to the educator and legisla-
ture.
1 2
The first substantial change in this attitude came with West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,13 in which the Supreme Court
recognized constitutional rights of students which were not to be sub-
ordinated to asserted interests of education. Similarly, the special
competence of the educator was brought into question in Brown v.
Board of Education'4 and subsequent cases.' 5  In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court ef-
fectively disavowed the competence of the educator where expression
is involved."' The effect of Tinker in substituting the court's judg-
ment for that of the school administrator in a major school disciplinary
problem was a significant departure from previous policy and prompted
a strong dissent from Justice Black.
7
By taking the position that the decisions of school administrators
were subject to review when First Amendment rights were involved, the
courts raised a major policy issue. To what extent should the inter-
ests or needs of education prevail against the free exercise of expres-
sion? While First Amendment freedoms have been accorded a preferred
position among other rights,' 8 education must be recognized as an ex-
11. See Ladd, supra note 7, at 222-26.
12. Id.
13. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. Ladd, supra note 7, considered this erosion of public confidence a secondary
effect which occurred during the efforts to implement the Brown decision. The re-
sistance of school administrators to the orders of the courts and their willingness to
abridge the rights of students because of personal motives or the desire to avoid
the pressure of community opinion, destroyed much of their credibility in the eyes
of the courts.
16. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The disavowal was achieved by a reversal of the
frame of reference of the courts. While the courts might defer to the educator where
academic matters were concerned, the opposite was true when constitutional freedoms
were at stake. By thus casting a major school disciplinary problem in terms with
which the courts were familiar, the Supreme Court finally rejected the special compe-
tence of the educator.
17. "The Court's holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely
new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected 'officials of state sup-
ported public schools . . .' in the United States is in ultimate effect transferred to
the Supreme Court." Id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
18. First Amendment freedoms are often said to have preferred status among
other rights. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 99 (1949); Weaver v. Jordan, 64
tremely important governmental function; education is necessary to
produce the informed citizenry vital to a workable democratic system,
and it is of great importance to the successful pursuit of happiness in
a modern economic society.19 School administrators need a means
of carrying out their educational responsibilities in accordance with the
expanded protection of students' rights.2"
The balancing of the competing interests of education and ex-
pression has been at issue in controversies involving a wide variety of
statutes, rules and regulations which are employed in the effort to
cope with disturbances in schools. 2 ' The statutes include general
Cal. 2d 235, 241, 411 P.2d 289, 293, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 541 (1966); ACLU v. Bd. of
Educ., 55 Cal. 2d 167, 178-79, 359 P.2d 45, 51, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653, 1961). This
theory is usually a part of the defense rhetoric in demonstration cases. For a good
argument against the preferred right doctrine see Weaver v. Jordan, supra, at 251-53,
411 P.2d at 300-01, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49 (Mosk, J., dissenting) and in re Mannino,
14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 973, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 892-93 (1971) (Elkington, J., dissenting);
see generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 25 (1959).
19. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 605-10, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-19 (1971). The
first section of the California Constitution article on education describes the purpose of
education as follows: "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essen-
tial to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and
agricultural improvement." CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (West 1954). This language
goes right to the heart of the problem. It would be incongruous to restrict a primary
right of the people in the interest of an activity whose purpose is the preservation of
those rights. "That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupu-
lous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount principles of government as
mere platitudes." West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943);
cf. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 608, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 618
(1971).
20. This problem has appeared recently in several contexts in which assertions
of the right to free expression came into conflict with various personal, societal and
governmental interests. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1965); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). Out of these conflicts have come a diverse and rapidly developing body of
law in which the society's interest in the protection of First Amendment rights is bal-
anced against other competent interests. The extent of permissible regulation resulting
from this balance defines the limits of protection. The delineation of protected and
unprotected expressions take a number of forms; malice in the libel of public figures, or
redeeming social value and pandering in obscenity. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; Roth v. United
States, supra.
21. The cases accompanying the following penal code citations involve, for the
most part, demonstrations in schools. In many of the cases First Amendment pro-
tection was claimed for the acts charged. For statutes in other states see Note,
Campus Confrontation: Resolution by Legislation, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 30, 37
(1970).
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criminal laws directed toward public order, such as those prohibiting
riot and incitement to riot,22 illegal assembly,2" false imprisonment,2 4
refusal to disperse,25 assault,26 disturbing the peace, 27 and obscenity.28
There are also special criminal statutes which are applicable only to
school facilities and involve the same sorts of offenses as the general
laws.29 Misdemeanor and felony penalties provided by these statutes
ard applicable to both students and non-students. Conspiracy to
violate one or more of the above has also occasionally been charged,
usually in an attempt to make violation of a misdemeanor statute pun-
ishable as a felony.31
In addition to the criminal statutes, school boards and admin-
istrators are provided with the rule making authority to protect facilities,
advance education, and maintain discipline in the schools.32 Academic
22. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 404-5 (West 1970); People v. Davis, 68 Cal. 2d 481,
439 P.2d 651, 67 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1968).
23. CAL. PEN. CODE H3 407-10 (West 1970); In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34,
49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966).
24. CAL. PEN. CODE § 236-37 (West 1970); People v. Arvanites, 17 Cal. App.
3d 1052, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1971) (conspiracy to falsely imprison; holding the Dean
in his office until he agreed to certain demands). The court's dismissal of the claim
to constitutional protection was remarkably terse; "[T]o equate the conduct of the group
which imprisoned [the Dean] with a constitutionally protected demonstration seems
absurd.... [Their purpose] was not to publicize a grievance or petition for a re-
dress thereof, but extortion." Id. at 1059, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
25. CAL. PEN. CODE § 409 (West 1970); People v. Uptgraft, 8 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 1, 87 Cal. Rptr. 459, App. Dept. Super. Ct., cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
26. CAL. PEN. CODE § 240-41 (West 1970); In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d
953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971).
27. CAL. PEN. CODE § 415 (West 1970); Castro v. Superior Ct. of L.A. County,
9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970).
28. Cf. Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); CAL. PEN. CODE § 647 (West 1970); CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.2
(West 1970); CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.6 (West Supp. 1972).
29. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 415.5 (West 1970) (disturbing the peace of a com-
munity college, state college or university); CAL. PEN. CODE § 626.8 (West 1970)
(disruptive presence at schools); People v. Horton, 9 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 818 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1970); CAL. PEN. CODE § 626.4 (West 1970) (entry
upon campus knowing that permission to enter has been denied).
30. In discussing disorder in the schools, not only students but teachers and
nonstudents are typically involved. Since the criminal statutes and school regulations
will generally apply equally to these groups, the terms "student" or "demonstrator"
may be used to denote members of the group opposing the school authorities during
a demonstration. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13558.5 (West 1969) for an example of
special laws relating only to nonstudents. For a discussion of the status of students
on leave, suspension, or other special relationship to the academic community, see
Comment, The University and the Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents to
University Property, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 132 (1966).
31. E.g., People v. Arvanites, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1052, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1971);
Castro v. Superior Ct. of L.A. County, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970).
32. E.g., CAL. FDUC. CODE §§ 22600, 23604 (West 1969).
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penalties such as suspension or expulsion are provided for violation of
these rules.3 They are, of course, applicable only to members of
the academic community. In addition to academic penalties, statutes
often provide that violation of school rules or regulations will consti-
tute a misdemeanor. 4
While demonstrations in a school may involve violations of a
number of criminal statutes or administrative regulations, demonstra-
tors invariably claim First Amendment protection for their conduct.3 5
These various statutes, rules and regulations increasingly have become
subject to constitutional attack on First Amendment grounds.
The Disturbance Standard
The regulation of the violent conduct prohibited by many of the
criminal statutes posed few constitutional problems; the First Amend-
ment provides no protection for violent conduct, whether it occurs in
or out of a school. 6 The problems appeared when "pure speech"
and other non-violent forms of expression disrupted a school.
In the landmark Tinker decision, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with an administrative, non-criminal, regulation of expres-
sion in the schools.37  This case arose out of the suspension of the
Tinker children for wearing black antiwar armbands in violation of a
school board order prohibiting this conduct. The majority of the
Court found that the symbolic conduct did not constitute an undue dis-
33. E.g., CAL. ADM. CODE § 41301.
34. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 23604.1 (West 1969); see People v. Hairston, 8
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 19, 87 Cal. Rptr. 470 (App. Dept. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 952 (1970).
35. Since both criminal and administrative sanctions may be imposed under a
variety of statutes or rules for a given disruptive act, and since the choice of sanctions
may be made after the act, no distinction should be made between decisions in criminal
cases and those in civil cases in which the validity of a regulation is challenged prior
to its violation. Where expression is concerned, a regulation may be challenged with-
out regard to the normal rules of standing. See Dombrowski v. Pf~ster, 380 U.S. 479
(1965). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 844, 855-56 (1970).
36. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969); Los Angeles Teachers Local 1021, AFT v. Los Angeles City Bd.
of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 558-59, 455 P.2d 827, 835, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 731 (1969).
Closely related to expression by violent means is conduct which physically obstructs
or interferes with normal activities in a school. Picketing and "sitting-in" halls and
offices is not protected when it blocks access to buildings or offices or movement in
halls or on sidewalks. See, e.g., People v. Horton, 9 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 818 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1970). When it does not block but only impedes
traffic, the conduct may be protected. Cf. Mandel v. Municipal Ct., 276 Cal. App. 2d
649, 81 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1969). The extent of interference is a factual issue to be de-
termined by disturbance criteria.
37. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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turbance of a classroom and, therefore, was protected by the First
Amendment against regulation.18 The Court cited approvingly the dis-
tinction made in two Fifth Circuit cases, Burnside v. Byars 9 and Black-
well v. Issaquena County Board of Education.40 These cases involved re-
lated expressive conduct, the wearing of protest buttons. In Burnside
v. Byars the expression was protected against regulation because the
court found that no disruption occurred or was threatened.4 In con-
trast, the Blackwell court found that the wearing of the buttons resulted
in arguments, pushing and shoving in the halls, and intimidation of
other students.42 The court therefore upheld the prohibition of the
expression which caused the disturbance rather than requiring the
school authorities to focus disciplinary measures on the resultant dis-
ruptive acts, i.e., the scuffling, intimidation or arguing. 43 The distinc-
tion between the two cases is the existence or nonexistence of "disturb-
ance of educational activities" resulting from the challenged expression.
"Disturbance" may thus be seen as the key to the permissible reg-
ulation of the time, place and manner of expression in the schools.44
Where disturbance of educational activities occurs or is reasonably
expected, a wide variety of criminal or administrative sanctions may
be employed against the expression.45  Where this disruption is lack-
38. Id. at 505, 513-14. In his dissent, Justice Black disagrees with this finding,
noting the distraction of pupils from studies, talking in class and other minor disrup-
tions. Id. at 517-18.
39. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
40. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
41. 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966).
42. 363 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1966).
43. Id. at 754.
44. "The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our demo-
cratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may
address a group at any public place and at any time. . . . We emphatically reject
the notion ...that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same freedom
to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and
picketing . . . as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).
45. The restraint must be designed to further some societal interest whose bene-
fits must outweigh the resulting impairment of the constitutional right, and there should
be no equally beneficial alternative which is less subversive of the right. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., 65
Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966). See generally Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969). That equal protection
requirements apply to limitations of First Amendment rights is implied in Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). The state action required by the equal protection
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment is present because school administrators
and teachers are creatures of the state. West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943); cf. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245,
257 (1934). While complete prohibition of expression is forbidden by the First Amend-
ment, some nominally public facilities have been held to be functionally nonpublic,
1269
ing, the First Amendment protects the expression against any regula-
tion.
The Court in Tinker did not explain in any detail what would
constitute disturbance of educational activities, or whether all activi-
ties carried on at a school could be protected against disruption from
conduct within the purview of the First Amendment. Instead, the
Court concentrated on the limitations on the authority of school admin-
istrators. In order to restrict expression "undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance" will not suffice.46
[School officials] must be able to show that [their] action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discom-
fort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
point.
47
As to "how much more," the Court approved the Burnside v. Byars re-
quirement that material and substantial interference with the require-
ments of the educational activities affected is necessary. 48
The California Supreme Court followed the Tinker doctrine in Los
Angeles Teachers Union, Local 1021, AFT v. Los Angeles City Board
of Education,49 a suit to invalidate a regulation prohibiting the solicita-
tion of signatures for a petition during school hours. The court found
that this activity was within the scope of the First Amendment, and
that when carried out during the lunch hour it caused no material or
substantial interference with any valid educational interest. The court
refused to accept the school's contention that the solicitation could
have been carried on outside of school hours. The court found instead
that the activity was most effective during school hours and could not
be restricted during this time without the loss of its expressive value.
The decision did not specify what would constitute a material or sub-
stantial intereference, except that it would require a "significant threat
to the 'efficiency and integrity of the public service.' "5 0
closed to demonstrators as well as to nondemonstrators. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jails). Private property has, however, been sometimes held to be
functionally public. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970)
(shopping centers); In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969)
(privately owned sidewalk). Other public facilities have been held to be improper
for demonstrations although they are open to the public. See, e.g., Cameron v. John-
son, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (courthouses).
But see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (public libraries); Edwards v. So.
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (state capital). Under Tinker, schools are clearly not
such places. 393 U.S. at 511-12.
46. 393 U.S. at 508.
47. Id. at 509.
48. Id.
49. 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
50. Id. at 564, 455 P.2d at 835, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
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Some of the language in these principal cases suggests that only se-
vere disruptions sufficient to incapacitate educational activities could
justify regulation of expression. 51 This interpretation is undoubtedly
not the intent of the courts. The implication in Tinker is that inter-
ference with the progress of minor activities such as a single lesson
might be prohibited. 52 Interference, like disturbance, is a highly sub-
jective term, however. The type of conduct that might be disturbing
enough to interfere with a class will vary according to the setting, the
personalities, and even the message of the demonstrators.53 Various
topics, teaching methods, and class experience or maturity levels may
dictate the degree of permissible interference from dissent, unrest, or
argument.54 In libraries the standards might be far stricter, whereas
on school grounds outside classroom buildings, only concern for the
prevention of violence might justify the regulation of expression. The
necessities and usages of each separate educational activity will thus
give rise to different standards regarding what constitutes disruption
or disturbance.
51. The Tinker decision alludes to the "comprehensive authority of . . . school
officials" to maintain discipline, but does not spell out what other expressive conduct
might have been accorded the same protection as that given to the wearing of arm-
bands. 393 U.S. at 507, citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Jus-
tice Stewart concurring in Epperson distinguished between the valid authority of the
school administrator to define and prescribe a curriculum and the wholly invalid
attempt to extend that authority to the abridgment of expression. 393 U.S. at 116.
52. 393 U.S. at 508. There is an indication that the case might have gone the
other way if Mary Beth Tinker had done anything but sit at her desk, saying nothing,
and looking straight ahead. Many courts have taken this line. See, e.g., Lipkis v.
Caveney, 19 Cal. App. 3d 383, 96 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1971). This was a suit to compel
school authorities to permit speeches in the school "quad." The prohibition was based
on the fact that several unauthorized speeches previously had resulted in disorder.
On one of these occasions the disruption consisted of the audience heckling the princi-
pal's attempt to silence a speaker addressing students eating their lunches in the quad.
The court found that the principal's judgment that these speeches would cause a dis-
ruption of the educational process was based on twenty years experience with student
gatherings resembling the intended rallies, and was "anything but based on undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension of disturbance." See text accompanying note 46 supra.
The prohibition was accordingly upheld.
53. Normally the courts summarily reject any suggestions that protection might
depend upon the content of the message. "It is not for this or any other court to
distinguish between issues and to select for constitutional protection only those which
it feels are of sufficient social importance." Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School
Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 1971). It should be clear, however, that certain
subjects, such as racial slurs, have such a high potential for disturbance that regulation
would be necessary. Cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
54. While the armbands worn in Tinker might not have distracted a class in
mathematics, for instance, a pure speech statement about Vietnam certainly would
have. Thus, in this case, conduct is protected to a greater extent than speech, rhetoric
to the contrary notwithstanding. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
and Disturbance of the Peace
Concurrent with the establishment of the "disturbance" stand-
ard articulated in Tinker, a second approach to the problem, the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, was gaining increasing favor." This
doctrine permits a facial attack on the validity of a statute, rule or reg-
ulation irrespective of the facts of the particular case."0 The result has
been the frequent invalidation of general disturbance of the peace stat-
utes.
57
The theory of the overbreadth doctrine is that regulations aimed at
expressive conduct or at conduct associated with speech must be drawn
narrowly and with specificity so as to prohibit only conduct deemed
evil.58 When a statute is not sufficiently narrow or specific, but in-
stead is drawn so as to encompass activities protected by the First
Amendment, it is overbroad. Any statute which restricts expression
in general terms or which lends itself to a substantial number of over-
broad applications may be declared unconstitutional on its face in-
stead of merely being construed so as to eliminate the invalid applica-
tions.5 9
The primary value of this "facial attack" as a defense lies not in
its legal theory but in its procedural aspects. Because of the "chilling
effect" of overbroad laws on the exercise of First Amendment free-
doms, a defendant may not be burdened by such a law even if his par-
ticular conduct is not protected and could have been prohibited by
a properly drawn regulation °0 In order to demonstrate the overbreadth
of a statute, instances in which it might apply to and prohibit protected
conduct are brought to the court's attention. These situations need not
be documented; they may be wholly hypothetical cases. If the statute
55. The allegation of unconstitutionality because of overbreadth has become a
sort of "common count" along with the "chilling effect" rhetoric, in the defense of
demonstration cases. See, e.g., In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 375 (1970); Castro v. Superior Ct. of L.A. County, 9 Cal. App. 675, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 500 (1970). For a discussion of the history, theory, and problems involved in
the doctrine see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844 (1970).
56. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940).
57. See, e.g., Castro v. Superior Ct. of L.A. County, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 500 (1970).
58. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
59. Id. at 432-33.
60. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940). Another important effect of the doctrine is that a regulation may
be challenged before it has been violated; the normal rules of standing are relaxed
when expression is involved. Dombrowski v. Pfister supra.
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can be shown to apply to a substantial number of such situations, it
may be declared unconstitutional without any consideration of the
facts of the case before the court."'
The facial approach to overbroad laws is an extremely valuable
device for attacking statutes or regulations whose purpose is the sup-
pression of expression through the prohibition of conduct associated
with or vital to the dissemination of that expression. The doctrine is
also extremely valuable for forcing precision of draftsmanship where
the discretionary authority of an official may extend to allow the abridg-
ment of protected activities. 2 The approach has less validity when
used to invalidate statutes directed at conduct which may only inci-
dentally be connected with expression.
General public order statutes prohibiting disturbance of the peace
are frequently employed against demonstrators and have often been
struck down in their entirety for overbreadth. The hypothetical situa-
tion which is usually advanced in such cases to show the sweeping na-
ture of the statutory language is that onlookers may be "disturbed"
by ideas or arguments with which they disagree or find distasteful.63
The statutes are not necessarily overbroad in the majority of appli-
cations, and could not be said to have been enacted to suppress free
expression. Their area of impact is conduct only incidentally associated
with expression and they are not directed at expression "by their
terms.""4  While it might seem easy for a court to construe such a
statute in a way which would eliminate the hypothetical invalid applica-
tion, many courts, including the Supreme Court, have chosen to employ
the facial approach.
The solution to the problem of overbroad laws is said to be preci-
sion of draftsmanship. Unfortunately, the courts do not often explain
how this is to be accomplished. The Supreme Court has said:
[It is] not our duty and indeed not within our power to set out
and define with precision just what statutes can be lawfully enacted
to deal with [disruptive] situations.6 5
It is also recognized, however, that "it is very easy to read a statute
to permit some hypothetical violation of civil rights but difficult to draft
61. Fort v. Civil Service Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr.
625 (1964).
62. Cf. Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal. 2d 684, 441 P.2d 281, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 721 (1968) (licensing statute permitting overbroad discretionary authority to be
exercised by a censorship board).
63. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); Castor v. Superior
Ct. of L.A. County, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 701-03, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500, 520-21 (1970).
64. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 844, 858-65 (1970).
65. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black and Douglas, J.L,
concurring).
one which will not be subject to the same infirmity." 6 Consequently,
many courts refuse to accept the facial approach unless the statute
seems clearly directed at expression itself. These courts use the tradi-
tional as applied approach for statutes principally aimed at conduct
other than expression. The statute is thus reshaped by judicial con-
struction to excise the impermissible applications.
The necessity of reshaping statutes under the as applied approach
is one of the major problems with the doctrine for courts. Conse-
quently, even within the same jurisdiction different courts disagree as
to the doctrine's applicability. The California Supreme Court, for in-
stance, leans toward the as applied approach, and has approved of a
number of general antidisturbance regulations by eliminating improper
applications. 6 Lower California courts have used the facial approach
to invalidate other substantially similar laws.
The Overbreadth Doctrine in the Schools
Criminal statutes are not the only prohibitions which may be sub-
ject to attack for overbreadth; administrative regulations and even or-
ders by school officials and teachers may be scrutinized. "8 The doc-
trine will apply whenever a regulation of conduct is so sweeping that
protected activities may be prohibited. As previously discussed,
constitutional protection of expression in schools hinges upon whether
that expression results in any disturbance of educational activities. If
a facial attack on a regulation is permitted by a court, the issue of con-
stitutional protection based on the disturbance standard will not be
reached.
A typical example of this situation occurred in a 1970 California
case Castro v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 9 which chal-
66. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 304 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
accord, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
67. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); In re
Kay, I Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970); In re Bushman, 1 Cal.
3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970). Only when regulations seem
directed at expression itself or at some form of expressive conduct does the court
allow the facial attack of the overbreadth doctrine. Cf. Burton v. Municipal Court,
68 Cal. 2d 684, 441 P.2d 281, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1968).
68. See generally Note, Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus, 80 YALE
L.J. 1261 (1971). The overbreadth doctrine had been applied to school administrative
rules by lower courts in many cases prior to Tinker. The following cases are examples
of situations where the facial approach of the overbreadth doctrine had invalidated a
rule even though some of the acts involved might constitutionally have been prohibited.
Soglin v. Kaufman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of
Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Il1. 1968) (statute unconstitutional on its face
and as applied); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968); Hammond
v. So. Car. St. College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
69. 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970).
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lenged the constitutionality of California Education Code § 16701.70
This law was a generally worded disturbance statute designed to pre-
vent disorder in the schools. It provided that: "[a]ny person who
wilfully disturbs any public school or any public school meeting is
guilty of a misdemeanor." This statute was first enacted in 1873, and
remained unchanged until 1969 when the original fine of $10 to $100
was changed to not more than $250.71 During the ninety-seven year
life of the statute, its validity was never tested at the appellate level.
Similar California statutes prohibit disturbing the peace in general, 72
at state colleges and universities, 73 and at religious74 and public75 meet-
ings. However, in Castro, Education Code § 16701 was declared uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that "disturb" was a term subject to general
and sweeping application in that persons could be disturbed by dis-
quieting ideas or concepts.7
6
This decision was based upon a consideration of the possibility of
invalid application in hypothetical situations; the acts of the defend-
ants played no part in the court's determination. In fact, the court
agreed that the petitioners had committed a number of unlawful acts
and lamented that the decision might prevent punishment for these
acts. 77  The court even agreed that the defendants had disturbed the
school.78  The use of the facial approach thus precluded the applica-
70. Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 2, § 16701, at 1125.
71. The statute passed through a number of codes during its lifetime: CAL. POL.
CODE § 1868 and SCHOOL CODE § 3.70 (added Cal. Amend. 1873-74, ch. 543, § 62, at
111); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 19501 (Cal. Stat. 1943, ch. 71, § 19501, at 692); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 16701 (Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 2, § 16701, at 1125). The 1969 revision
changed the wording slightly: "Any person who willfully disturbs any public school
or any public meeting is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of
not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250)." Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 972, § 3, at
1934). In 1972, after being held unconstitutional in Castro v. Superior Ct. of L.A.
County, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 99 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970), § 16701 was re-enacted, word-
for-word, as § 16675. Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 670, § 4, at 658-59. This appeared to
be a legislative oversight-clearing a block of code numbers for a major piece of
legislation- rather than a casting of the gauntlet to the courts. See AB 99, § 4,
1972 J. OF T E CA IF. SENATE, at 3910, 4879.
72. CAL. PEN. CODE § 415 (West 1970); In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463
P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970).
73. CAL. PEN. CODE § 415.5 (West Supp. 1972).
74. CAL. PEN. CODE § 302 (West 1970); People v. Cruz, 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1972).
75. CAL. PEN. CODE § 403 (West 1970); In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d
142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970).
76. 9 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
77. Id. at 677, 679, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 502, 503. The acts included the basic
demonstration repertoire: threats and obscenities hurled at school officials, mass walk-
outs, garbage cans tossed down stairs, fires set, and rocks, bottles and cherry bombs
thrown. Id. at 679-80, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
78. Id. at 679 n.3, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 503 n.3, the majority cited flagrant viola-
tion of the disturbance standard enunciated in Tinker.7 9
The Effect of Grayned v. City of Rockford
It is against this background of competing interests and First
Amendment theories that Grayned v. City of Rockford must be viewed.80
This case involved a statute very similar to California Education Code
§ 16701, ruled unconstitutional in Castro v. Superior Court. The or-
dinance in Grayned prohibited "mak[ing] or assist[ing] in the making
of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace
or good order of [a] school session or class thereof . . . ."I' This
law is clearly subject to the same infirmities as California Education
Code § 16701. Students' minds or attention might be "diverted"
from their studies by disquieting ideas; they might be "disturbed" by a
speech protesting actions in Vietnam.82 The United States Supreme
Court nonetheless rejected the contention that this statute was over-
broad. The Court held that the law was not "a vague, general 'breach of
the peace' ordinance, but a statute written specifically for the school
context, where the prohibited disturbances are easily measured by their
impact on the normal activities of the school." '
Between the rival theories of the facial approach of the over-
breadth doctrine and the disturbance standard, the Court in Grayned
clearly chose the latter. The Court found that the statute in Grayned
was "narrowly tailored to further Rockford's compelling interest in hav-
ing an undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learn-
ing."' 4  Since this regulation is subject to the same potentially invalid
tions of CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13558.5 (West 1969) prohibiting nonstudents from entering
school grounds and interfering willfully with the operation of a school with intent
to disrupt it. In footnote 4 the court cited evidence of planning and organizing the
walkout, but it denied that direct evidence existed of planning to violate CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 16701. While concurring in the result, Associate Justice Stevens correctly
recognized that "anyone who conspires with others to cause high school students to
abandon their classes and achieves such purpose by causing a 'walkout' during the
school session certainly 'disturbs'-to the point of extinction-the 'school' for a build-
ing without students is not a school, except in name only." 9 Cal. App. 3d at 708-09,
88 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
79. It should be noted that CAL. EDUC. CODE § 16701 was not the major issue
of the Castro case. The primary charges were conspiracy to violate § 16701 and CAL.
PEN. CODE § 415 (California's general disturbance of the peace statute). The case
was thus an attempt to apply felony penalties to violations of misdemeanor statutes,
and in the case of § 16701, a misdemeanor considered so minor that not even one
day of jail is prescribed as a punishment. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
80. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
81. Id. at 108.
82. This usage of "diversion" is that quoted in Grayned at 111 n.16.
83. Id. at 112.
84. Id. at 119.
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applications found objectionable in other cases, what the Court evidently
means is that the statute is tailored narrowly enough for the school
context. The statute cannot be overbroad because it "goes no fur-
ther than Tinker says a municipality may go to prevent interference
with its schools."85  A municipality may, therefore, prevent disorders
in its schools by enacting general antidisturbance regulations that
would be objectionably overbroad in other contexts.
The reason behind this exception to the rule against general
breach of the peace regulations must lie in a recognition of the sub-
jective nature of disturbance in the schools. The decision implies this
recognition:
Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical
certainty from our language. The words of the Rockford ordi-
nance are marked by "flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather
than meticulous specificity."8' 6
The necessary quantum of disturbance was neither specified
by the statute nor required by the Court. Whether a material or sub-
stantial disruption would be created by a particular demonstration
must depend upon "whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a par-
ticular time."8' 7  "That decision is made, as it should be, on an indi-
vidualized basis, given the particular fact situation.
88
The Implications of Grayned v. City of Rockford
The Supreme Court's decision in Grayned must be viewed in its
own limited context. It does not extend beyond the school situation,
and despite the Court's statements on the inherent limitations of lan-
guage, the decision is not a major setback for the overbreadth doctrine.
Even in the schools, regulations directed primarily at the content of
expression or at conduct inextricably tied to the dissemination of a
message, as in Tinker, will still be subject to facial attack. The Grayned
decision, however, did give legislatures and school boards the ability
to create general antidisturbance regulations in terms which would
allow school officials reasonable flexibility in coping with demon-
strations. The validity of those regulations would be determined on
an as applied basis using disturbance criteria. Applications of such
statutes to First Amendment protected conduct would be eliminated
by judicial construction, but the statute itself would not be held invalid.
Because of the subjective nature of disturbance in the schools,
the line between acceptable and unacceptable expression will not al-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 110.
87. Id. at 116.
88. Id. at 119.
1277
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ways be clear. As a result, demonstrators may not be given fair
warning of what the law forbids. Some special school regulations solve
this problem by empowering a school official to determine when im-
permissible disturbance exists or is imminent and then to issue orders
to demonstrators to desist or leave school grounds.89 Failure to leave
when ordered, or entry without permission after such an order, is de-
fined as a misdemeanor.
In the recent California Supreme Court case In re Kay this pro-
cedural concept was applied to a statute which did not include a notice
provision. 9° Kay involved the analogous situation of a disturbance of
a political meeting, the familiar setting of a campaign speech interrupted
by heckling. The statute involved was similar to California Education
Code § 16701, substituting "public assembly or meeting" for "school
or school meeting". 91 The court rejected a facial attack on the statute
and balanced the competing interests by finding that public meetings
and assemblages of all sorts have customs and usages necessary to
insure the effective conduct of their intended business.92  Expres-
sive conduct, known by a reasonable man to be outside of these cus-
toms and usages, may be regulated to the extent necessary to pre-
vent undue disruption. 93 Since these subjective standards clearly pro-
vide no warning to a dissenter when his conduct might cross the line
separating permissible from impermissible acts, fair and adequate
notice must be given before criminal penalties could attach. 94 Thus,
in Kay, a general disturbance ordinance with no provision for an or-
der to leave was held not to be effective until such an order had
been given.
This notice procedure might also solve the lack of fair warning
problem where schools are concerned. Flexible disturbance regula-
tions would not become operative until a school official had properly
determined that a material and substantial disruption either was occur-
ring or was imminent, and had notified the demonstrators that such
89. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 626.8 (West 1970); People v. Horton, 9 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 1, 87 Cal. Rptr. 818 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1970); People v. Agnello,
259 Cal. App. 2d 785, 66 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1968).
90. 1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970).
91. CAL. PEN. CODE § 403 (West 1970).
92. The court recognized the necessity in our political system for office-seekers
to express their views in public forums. It also recognized the utility, if not the ne-
cessity, of allowing free and open dissent from these views as a means of apprising
politicians of discontent among their constituents and of forcing comment on issues
which the politicians might rather ignore. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 938-40, 464 P.2d at 146-
48, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 690-92.
93. "This inhibition does not mean, however, that the state can grant to the
police a 'roving commission' to enforce Robert's Rules of Order." Id. at 948-49, 464
P.2d at 147, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
94. Id. at 945, 464 P.2d at 152, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
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conduct could not continue. 5
Under Gayned the school administrator might appear to be rein-
vested with much of the authority that he had lost as a result of Tinker.
This is not really the case. The administrative discretion exercised
under an otherwise valid disturbance statute can be no broader than
the scope of the statute itself. An overbroad exercise of discretion
which touches protected activities will be invalid; refusal to obey such
an invalid order can not be criminal. 96 The school administrator
must thus be prepared to justify to a reviewing court his determina-
tion that a mode of expression would have constituted an actual or
imminent disturbance of a valid educational activity.97  He must be
able to show that his determination was made in accordance with the
constitutionally acceptable construction of the statute.
A second major problem arising from the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of the subjective nature of disturbance involves the treatment of
related crimes, the associational and preparational crimes such as
conspiracy, solicitation and attempt. If it cannot be determined in
advance whether a given mode of expression will be constitutionally
protected or not, then the usual rules for these related crimes must be
modified. Both Castro and United States v. Spock 9s involved con-
spiracy charges resulting from expressive activities. In Castro, the
court required stricter standards of proof than those provided by the
normal circumstantial evidence rule for conspiracies.9 9 In Spock, the
95. This would have solved the Castro court's objection to the rehabilitation of
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 16701; see 9 Cal. App. 3d at 701, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
96. See Grody v. State, 278 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. 1972).
97. The reasonableness of the apprehension of violence by school administrators
must be closely scrutinized by the courts. In People v. Uptgraft, 8 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
1, 87 Cal. Rptr. 459 (App. Dept. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970), a two
month pattern of violence and property damage was held to justify a determination
that any assemblage would constitute a threat to public order and safety and was
therefore unlawful. Even though no violent acts occurred or seemed imminent to
obseivers or appeared on films of the demonstration, the appellate court accepted
the trial court's finding that any assemblage would constitute a clear and present
danger given the climate that existed on the campus. This decision seems highly
questionable; the courts should examine carefully any such arguments by officials
who declare demonstrations illegal. This is not meant to suggest that a valid and
reasonable anticipation of imminent violence or other disruption should not be grounds
for prior restraint of a demonstration. The ability to head-off disruption is a vital
part of authority to maintain order on a campus, but this authority must be exercised
within constitutional limitations. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). See
generally Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1482 (1970);
Rosenthal, Injunctive Relief Against Campus Disorders, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 746
(1970).
98. 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
99. The three members of the Castro court were so widely divided on this issue
that the lead opinion has no precedential value. Only one member of the court di-
rectly confronted their obvious distaste for the attempt to raise minor misdemeanor vio-
court limited the extent to which members of a group who plan a
demonstration will be responsible for the acts of other members. 10 °
Similar reasoning should apply to the other related crimes as well.
It is evident that related crimes should be charged only when the ob-
ject of the combination or preparation is the achievement of the ulti-
mate harm: disturbance of the school.
Conclusion
The effect of Grayned v. City of Rockford is twofold. It recog-
nizes the inherently subjective nature of disturbance in the schools,
and the need for flexibility in its regulation by upholding general
antidisturbance regulations; it also rejects the facial overbreadth ap-
proach in favor of the disturbance standard advanced by Tinker.
Under Grayned and Tinker school officials have the necessary au-
thority to cope with disruptive demonstrations. 101  They need only
understand the constitutional limitations of that authority and be
prepared to justify their actions in terms of those limitations. 102
The primary limitation, as always, is that the authority to prevent dis-
ruptions of educational activities should never be exercised to suppress
the expression of ideas.'
History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority,
dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard
of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately ac-
cepted. . . . The absence of such voices would be a symptom of
grave illness in our society.' 0
4
Lewis W. Teel
lations to the felony level. See 9 Cal. App. 3d at 711, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 526 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
100. 416 F.2d 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1969) (dictum).
101. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). This case provides further
support for the Grayned decision. Healy involved a denial of school recognition to
a Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) chapter based on the college president's
decision that the local SDS group had failed to show they were independent from the
national organization. The Supreme Court held this was an insufficient basis for denial
of recognition and a violation of petitioners' First Amendment rights. The court
added in dictum, however, a proper basis for nonrecognition might be the group's
refusal to comply with a rule requiring it to abide by reasonable campus regulations.
The Court thus supported validity of such regulations and the right of the school to
make prior agreements to follow those rules a precondition to school recognition. 408
U.S. at 191-94.
102. See generally Johnston, The First Amendment and Education-A Plea for
Peaceful Coexistence, 17 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (1972).
103. "In order to discourage [violent dissent] the courts must take pains to assure
that the channels of peaceful communication remain open and that peaceful activity is
fully protected." Los Angeles Teachers Local 1021, AFT v. Los Angeles City Bd.
of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 565, 455 P.2d 827, 836, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 732 (1969).
104. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957) (Warren, C.J.).
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